The Evolution of Academic Discourse on Sexual Orientation and the Law: An Introduction to a Festschrift in Honor of Jeffrey Sherman by Leslie, Christopher R.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 84
Issue 2 Symposium: The Evolution of Academic
Discourse on Sexual Orientation and the Law: A
Festschrift in Honor of Jeffrey Sherman
Article 1
April 2009
The Evolution of Academic Discourse on Sexual
Orientation and the Law: An Introduction to a
Festschrift in Honor of Jeffrey Sherman
Christopher R. Leslie
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher R. Leslie, The Evolution of Academic Discourse on Sexual Orientation and the Law: An Introduction to a Festschrift in Honor of
Jeffrey Sherman, 84 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 345 (2009).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol84/iss2/1
THE EVOLUTION OF ACADEMIC DISCOURSE ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW:
AN INTRODUCTION TO A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF JEFFREY
SHERMAN
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE*
The festschrift is the academic tradition, popular in Europe, in which
the retirement of a noted scholar is celebrated by other scholars who con-
tribute original works to a bound volume dedicated to the honoree. This
symposium takes the form of a festschrift in tribute of Professor Jeffrey
Sherman, who has announced his retirement from the Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law. For decades, Professor Sherman has excelled at all three ele-
ments that compose a remarkable legal academic career: he is a pioneering
and respected scholar, a brilliant classroom teacher who has effectively
educated and (by all accounts) wildly entertained thousands of law stu-
dents, and a generous colleague whose sage, sanguine, and always clever
advice is sought by other professors, both seasoned and budding scholars.
The theme of this symposium is The Evolution of Sexual Orientation
and the Law because Professor Sherman played an important role in this
history. This introduction will briefly explore the role of legal academics in
this evolution. Part One will review some of the many ways that the law
affected the lives of gay people and will note the relative absence of legal
scholarship discussing these issues for several decades. Part Two will posit
some explanations for the dearth of law review articles and examine the
significance of those early scholars, including Professor Sherman, who
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. This symposium would not have been
possible without the excellent efforts of several people. At the beginning, Professor David Gerber
proved instrumental in getting this project off the ground. The contributors to this symposium represent
some of the most respected academics in the field. Finally, the editors of the law review provided adept
editing.
This introduction requires an enormous caveat. Throughout the introduction, assertions are made
about the dearth of scholarship in many areas of law related to gay rights. Such assertions are inherently
dangerous because relevant literature could easily exist that I am unaware of. To verify the presence or
absence of pertinent scholarship, my research assistant-the extraordinarily capable Kate Sedey-and I
performed exhaustive research in the Index to Legal Periodicals and Books and the Current Law Index,
and various searches of Westlaw, Lexis, and Hein OnLine. If I have overlooked germane scholarship,
the responsibility is mine alone and the omission reflects a failure on my part, and is not intended as a
slight on the omitted scholarship. I apologize in advance for any oversights.
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helped create the academic subject of Sexual Orientation and the Law.
Finally, Part Three will introduce the articles that compose this symposium
and attempt to put them into historical context.
I. EARLY GAY LEGAL CONTROVERSIES AND THE DEARTH OF
SCHOLARSHIP
Much of the history of gay Americans in the twentieth century can be
told as a legal narrative. Government actors at all levels developed plentiful
means to persecute and discriminate against gay men and lesbians. This
Part highlights some examples and briefly surveys state criminal laws,
federal immigration law, military policy, employment discrimination, the
associational rights implicated by gay bars and student organizations, the
debate over antidiscrimination laws, and family law, including custody
issues and same-sex marriage.
A. Sodomy Laws
Until the early 1960s, every state in the union criminalized homosex-
ual conduct through sodomy laws. Sodomy laws proscribed all oral and
anal sex between consenting adults, even if done in private. Most sodomy
laws condemned both heterosexual and homosexual conduct, but the laws
were widely interpreted and applied to focus on same-sex relations.
The consequences for violating sodomy laws were significant. As of
the late 1950s, Colorado, Georgia, and Nevada provided for a life sentence
for a sodomy conviction; in Georgia, a life sentence was mandatory unless
clemency was recommended; North Carolina had a 60-year maximum sen-
tence and Connecticut a 30-year maximum sentence. At least 9 states had a
20-year maximum sentence and another 8 states had a 15-year maximum
sentence. Finally, 17 states had a 10-year maximum sentence for those
convicted of private sexual relations between consenting adults.' In addi-
tion to potential criminal punishments, government actors invoked sodomy
laws to label gay people as a group as criminal--even without evidence of
any illegal conduct-and thus justify discrimination against gay men and
lesbians in employment, family law, and immigration matters.2
Most people have assumed that sodomy laws were not actively en-
1. Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., An Evaluation of the Homosexual Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 187,
190(1957).
2. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy
Laws, 35 HARV. C.R. -C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000).
[Vol 84:2
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
forced. 3 Although arrests and prosecutions were rare by the 1980s, Profes-
sor William Eskridge estimates that "between 1946 and 1961 [states] im-
posed criminal punishments on as many as a million lesbians and gay men
engaged in consensual adult intercourse, dancing, kissing, or holding
hands."'4 While most gay men charged with sodomy plea-bargained to a
lesser offense to avoid the humiliation of a public trial, others were impris-
oned for engaging in consensual sex with another adult.5
Sodomy statutes received significant judicial attention during the
1960s and 1970s as court after court upheld the legality of laws criminaliz-
ing private sexual conduct.6 Many judicial battles implicated numerous
legal issues, especially when state actors manipulated procedural rules in
order to protect sodomy laws from adverse judicial decisions. 7 Moreover,
in the 1970s the Supreme Court itself had upheld sodomy laws as constitu-
tional against vagueness challenges-brought because many statutes sim-
ply referred to "the abominable and detestable crime against nature"
without actually defining the crime. 8 The Court also summarily affirmed a
lower court decision that sodomy laws did not violate the constitutional
right to privacy. 9
Legal debates ensued outside of the courts as well. As early as 1955,
the members of the American Law Institute advocated removing private
consensual sodomy between same-sex adults from the crimes listed in the
institute's Model Penal Code. 10 The ALI Council, however, "rejected the
3. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 51 (1988)
("sodomy laws are virtually never enforced"); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 309 (1992)
(referring to sodomy laws as "dead letters").
4. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW 60 (1999).
5. Id. at 66 ("Hence, each year between 1946 and 1965, between 800 and 4,250 people, on
average, were arrested for consensual sodomy. These were the most serious encounters with the law,
and some sodomy defendants went to jail or a mental hospital for decades. (Most, however, plea-
bargained to a lesser offense.)").
6. See, e.g., Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub. noma. Lovisi v.
Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Buck, 342 A.2d 48, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Carter v.
State, 500 S.W.2d 368, 373 (Ark. 1973); People v. Sharpe, 514 P.2d 1138 (Colo. 1973); Smashum v.
State, 403 S.E.2d 797, 249 (Ga. 1991); State v. Thompson, 558 P.2d 1079 (Kan. 1976); Hughes v.
State, 287 A.2d 299 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Worthing-
ton, 582 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Dinkens v. State, 546 P.2d 228, 231 (Nev. 1976); Jones
v. State, 456 P.2d 429, 430-31 (Nev. 1969); State v. Armstrong, 511 P.2d 560, 563 (N.M. Ct. App.
1973); State v. Kasakoff, 503 P.2d 1182, 1183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972); Moore v. State, 501 P.2d 529
(Okla. Crim. App. 1972); State v. Levitt, 371 A.2d 596, 599 (R.I. 1977).
7. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Procedural Rules or Procedural Pretexts?: A Case Study of
Procedural Hurdles in Constitutional Challenges to the Texas Sodomy Law, 89 KY. L. J. 1109 (2000-
2001).
8. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 21 n.1, 22 (1973).
9. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va. 1975), affd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976).
10. Estelle B. Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires ": The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-
2009]
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proposal because homosexuality 'is a cause or symptom of moral decay in
a society and should be repressed by law."' 1 Even the American Civil
Liberties Union endorsed criminalizing private sexual conduct between
adult men. In 1957, the ACLU issued a statement that sodomy laws were
constitutional and that it was "not within the province of the Union to
evaluate the social validity of the laws aimed at the suppression or elimina-
tion of homosexuals."' 2
Law professors knew that police were using sodomy laws to harass
and discriminate against gay people. Research published in law reviews-
by authors who were not law professors--documented the abuse that gay
men suffered at the hands of police and state actors. 13 Mainstream authors
wrote books that indicted sodomy laws, arguing that states could not
widely enforce the laws because "if they had, more than 80 percent of the
population would be in jail." 14 Instead, law enforcement officials used gen-
der-neutral laws to target the gay population, often engaging in entrapment
and lying to secure convictions. 15
Despite the ubiquity, insidiousness, and arguable unconstitutionality
of sodomy statutes, law professors did not take up the cause en masse and
write law review articles arguing that state sodomy laws were unconstitu-
tional. The outstanding exception was Professor David A. J. Richards, who
published several articles beginning in the late 1970s that developed fully
conceived models for why the constitutional right to privacy precluded
government from criminalizing the private sexual conduct of consenting
adults. 16 Other law professors did not join Professor Richards' brave effort
1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83, 103 n.43 (1987) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE 276 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
1955)).
11. Id.
12. PATRICIA CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS 67-68 (2000).
13. Steven A. Rosen, Police Harassment of Homosexual Women and Men in New York City,
1960-1980,12 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 159, 159-90 (1980-1981); Jon J. Gallo et al., The Consenting
Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles
County, 13 UCLA L. REV. 643 (1966).
14. JOHN GERASSI, THE BOYS OF BOISE 100-01 (1966).
15. CAIN, supra note 12, at 54.
16. David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Privacy and Homosexual Love, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 895 (1986); David A. J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 30 (1979);
David A. J. Richards, Selected Presentations from the Conference on the Fight for Gay Rights-
Homosexuality and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 311 (1978-
1979); David A. J. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977). Other professors did more specific studies. See Robert G. Fisher, Sex
Offender Provisions of the Proposed New Maryland Criminal Code: Should Private, Consenting Adult
Homosexual Behavior be Excluded?, 30 MD. L. REV. 91 (1970); Katheryn D. Katz, Sexual Morality and
the Constitution: People v. Onofre, 46 ALB. L. REV. 311 (1982). So did at least two practitioners. See
June A. Eichbaum, Lovisi v. Slayton: Constitutional Privacy and Sexual Expression, 10 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 525 (1978-1979); Randy Von Beitel, Criminalization of Private Homosexual Acts: A
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until a decade later in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick.17 In contrast, dozens of law students authored notes and com-
ments discussing, scrutinizing, and advocating the invalidation of state
sodomy laws well before the Bowers decision. 18 The sheer ratio of student-
authored notes to law professor-authored articles on the constitutionality of
sodomy laws is surprising. Absent Professor Richards' pioneering scholar-
ship, the ratio would have been staggering.
B. Sexual Psychopath Laws
Operating in tandem with sodomy statutes were state sexual psycho-
path laws. These laws were passed in response to so-called "sex crime pan-
Jurisprudential Study of a Decision by the Texas Bar Penal Code Revision Committee, 6 HUM. RTS. 23
(1976).
17. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
18. Debra M. Bamhart, Note, Commonwealth v. Bonadio: Voluntary Deviate Sexual Inter-
course-A Comparative Analysis, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 253 (1981); Gerald E. Berendt, Laws Which
Prohibit Consenting Adults from Participating in Homosexual Activities in Private, 23 S.C. L. REV. 816
(1971); Catherine E. Blackburn, Human Rights in an International Context: Recognizing the Right of
Intimate Association, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1982); Arthur E. Brooks, Sodomy Statutes are Constitu-
tional, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645 (1985); Constitutional Protection of Private Sexual Conduct
Among Consenting Adults: Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 568 (1976); Constitu-
tionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974); Leslie L.
Cooney, Sodomy Statutes-Supreme Court Summary Affirmance, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 123 (1976); Thomas
T. Couris, Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults: Why Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206 (1971); Roger B. Coven,
Constitutional Law: The Constitutional Right of Sexual Privacy, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1312 (1978);
Nan Feyler, The Use of the State Constitutional Right to Privacy to Defeat State Sodomy Laws, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 973 (1986); Elisa L. Fuller, An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney out of the Closet, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973 (1985); Irv S. Goodman, The
Bedroom Should not be Within the Province of the Law, 4 CAL. W. L. REV. 115 (1968); Sandra J.
Grove, Constitutionality of Minnesota's Sodomy Law, 2 LAW & INEQ. 521 (1984); Robert N. Harris Jr.,
Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Moral-
ity, 14 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1967); John L. Hollis, Sexual Offences: Sodomy-Cunnilingus, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 531 (1968); John P. Huggard, North Carolina's Sodomy Statute: A Need for Revision, 53
N.C. L. REV. 1037 (1975); Kathryn J. Humphrey, Right of Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws
Regulating Private Consensual Behavior, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1067 (1979); Robert A. Iglow, Oral
Copulation: A Constitutional Curtain Must be Drawn, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 523 (1974); Ronald P.
Johnsen, Sodomy Statutes: A Need for Change, 13 S.D. L. REV. 384 (1968 ); Richard T. Jones, Sodomy:
Crime or Sin?, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 83 (1959); W. Cecil Jones, Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney: Closing the Door to a Fundamental Right of Sexual Privacy, 53 DENV. L.J. 553 (1976);
James B. Kerr & David L. Winton, Extending the Right to Sexual Privacy, 2 W. ST. U. L. REV. 281
(1974); Carleton P. Ketcham Jr., Sodomy Statute not Describing Prohibited Conduct but Referring Only
to Crime Against Nature Held Unconstitutionally Overbroad, 3 CUMB.-SAMFORD L. REV. 525 (1972);
Paul L. Lamb, Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Need for Legislative Reform, 57 KY. L.J. 591
(1968-1969); Tim O'Neill, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: A Set-Back for the Right to Privacy, 65
KY. L.J. 748 (1976-1977); Craig T. Pearson, The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges
to Sodomy Statutes, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 811 (1984); Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The
Crime and its Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J. 623 (1961); James J. Rizzo, Comment, Constitutionality of
Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (1976); John F. Simmons, Sodomy Statutes: The Question
of Constitutionality, 50 NEB. L. REV. 567 (1971); Ty Monroe Sparks, Unconstitutional Overbreadth of
the Texas Sodomy Statute, 2 TEx. TECH L. REV. 115 (1970); Carleton H.A. Taber, Consent not Moral-
ity, as the Proper Limitation on Sexual Privacy, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637 (1977).
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ics" caused by highly publicized incidents of kidnappings or assaults
against children. 19 In the post-war era of the 1940s and 50s, most states,
"including all the urbanized jurisdictions of the East and West Coasts and
the Midwest, either enacted new sexual psychopath laws or revised exsiting
laws, or both .... -"20 Like sodomy statutes, these laws did not distinguish
between consensual and forcible acts.
Sexual psychopath laws differed from sodomy laws in several signifi-
cant ways. First, sodomy laws were, at least theoretically, gender neutral
and applied equally to heterosexuals and homosexuals. In many instances,
"sexual psychopathy is equated with homosexual, and male homosexual
offenders bear the brunt of the prosecutions."'21 Second, sexual psychopaths
were held in state mental hospitals or psychiatric wards of prisons, not in
traditional prisons.22 Third, the sentence under sexual psychopath laws was
indeterminate and those institutionalized could remain so "until the institu-
tional psychiatrists declared them cured."'23 This posed a particular problem
for gay men, since sexual orientation cannot be "cured" since it is inate and
biological.24 Fourth, the "treatments" inflicted on sexual psychopaths in
order to cure them included "electro-shock; hormonal injections; steriliza-
tion; group therapy; and, in some cases, frontal lobotomy. '25 Not surpris-
ingly, these procedures did not "cure homosexuality."
Armed with the pliable nature of sexual psychopath laws, government
action against those gay men began in earnest as homosexuals were labeled
sexual psychopaths because of their so-called deviant sexual orientation. In
some states, such as New Jersey, the sexual psychopath laws applied to
persons "merely suspected of sexual offenses. '26 In other states, sexual
psychopath laws interacted with sodomy laws as police and prosecutors
manipulated gay men accused of sodomy to plea bargain. In Iowa, for ex-
ample, gay men felt forced to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit sodomy
(which had a 3-year maximum sentence) to avoid prosecution on sodomy
charges (with a 10-year maximum penalty).27 The gay men thought that
pleading to the lesser charge would reduce their potential punishment. They
were wrong. Pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit sodomy meant that
19. Freedman, supra note 10, at 89.
20. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 61.
21. Glueck, supra note 1, at 208.
22. Freedman, supra note 10, at 98.
23. Id.
24. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents: An Emerging Political Geography of
Intellectual Property in Biotechnology, 84 WASH. U. L. R. 573, 582-90 (2006).
25. Freedman, supra note 10, at 99.
26. Glueck, supra note 1, at 191 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:164 (1953)).
27. NEIL MILLER, SEX-CRIME PANIC 121 (2002).
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they were declared to be "criminal sexual psychopaths. '28 In Iowa in the
mid-1950s, this process was used to institutionalize gay men in a state fa-
cility until they were "cured." 29
As with sodomy laws, sexual psychopath laws received a great deal of
local and national attention. On the one hand, "the media, law enforcement
agencies, and private citizens' groups took the lead in demanding" that
states enact sexual psychopath laws.30 On the other hand, most psychia-
trists and many lawyers opposed such laws. 31 In contrast, law professors in
the middle decades of the last century did not take up the case in scholar-
ship to argue why sexual psychopath laws (as applied to consensual con-
duct between adults) infringed on the rights of gay men and should be
either repealed by state legislatures or struck down by courts. Sexual psy-
chopath laws gradually fell into disfavor and many were repealed in the
1970s. 32 But legal scholarship authored by law professors did not seem to
play a significant role in the demise of state sexual psychopath laws be-
cause no such body of scholarship existed.
C. Immigration Policy
Once government officials began labeling gay men and lesbians as
psychopaths, the label had implications for immigration law. The Immigra-
tion Act of 1952 provided that individuals with a "psychopathic personal-
ity" could be denied entry into the country and deported if detected. 33
When circuit courts split as to whether gay people were, by definition, psy-
chopaths, 34 the Supreme Court in Boutilier v. INS held that "[t]he legisla-
tive history of the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the
Congress intended the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homo-
sexuals . . ."35 Boutilier represented the Supreme Court's first major written
opinion adjudicating the rights of homosexuals, and the Court "conclude[d]
that the Congress used the phrase 'psychopathic personality' not in the
clinical sense, but to effectuate its purpose to exclude from entry all homo-
28. Id.
29. Id. at xvii.
30. Freedman, supra note 10, at 84.
31. Id. at 84, 95-96.
32. The Iowa legislature, for example, repealed the state's sexual psychopath law in 1976.
MILLER, supra note 27, at 277.
33. Leslie, supra note 2, at 164-65.
34. Compare Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488 (2nd Cir. 1966), affd 387 U.S. 118 (1967), with
Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962).
35. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967).
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sexuals and other sex perverts." '36
The legal academy did not respond aggressively to either the Supreme
Court's decision or the congressional action to discriminate against gay
immigrants. 37 Even gay professors did not appear willing to argue in legal
scholarship that they were neither psychopaths nor perverts and that laws
that imposed blanket categorical hardships on homosexuals might violate
constitutional principles. In contrast, law students authored several articles
after Boutilier discussing and condemning the anti-gay policies. 38
D. Military Policy
Legally classified as criminals and psychopaths, homosexuals were
not officially welcomed into the U.S. armed forces. The American mili-
tary's discrimination against gay servicemembers had early roots but had
become well-entrenched by the conclusion of World War II. During World
War II, conservative estimates show that at least nine thousand sailors and
soldiers were discharged because of their homosexuality. 39 The Defense
Department modified its policies over the years, but the basic anti-gay fea-
tures remained the same. 40 During the 1970s and 1980s, discharged ser-
36. Id. at 122.
37. Practitioners did, however, author a small number of articles on the topic. Allan Ashman,
Immigration... Homosexual Aliens, 68 A.B.A. J. 1499 (1982); Peter N. Fowler & Leonard Graff, Gay
Aliens and Immigration: Resolving the Conflict Between Hill and Longstaff 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 621
(1985); Maurice A. Roberts, Sex and the Immigration Laws, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1976).
38. Marc Bogatin, Immigration and Nationality Act and the Exclusion of Homosexuals: Boutlier
v. INS Revisited, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 359 (1981); Thomas R. Byrne & Francis M. Mulligan, "Psycho-
pathic Personality" and "Sexual Deviation ": Medical Terms or Legal Catch-A ls-Analysis of the
Status of the Homosexual Alien, 40 TEMP. L. REV. 328 (1967); Ann D. Dexter, Homosexual Aliens
Excludable Without Certification as Psychopathic Personalities-In re Longstaff, 18 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 537 (1984); Rachel A. Hexter, "Good Moral Character" Requirement is a Question of Federal
Law, Nemetz v INS, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. Rev. 383 (1982); Walter E. Leggett, Alien, a Veteran
who Served Honorably in the U.S. Armed Forces and Whose Requirements for Citizenship are Other-
wise Eased, Cannot be Denied Citizenship for Lack of "Good Moral Character " Solely on the Basis of
His Homosexuality, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L . 333 (1976); Robert Poznanski, The Propriety of Deny-
ing Entry to Homosexual Aliens: Examining the Public Health Service's Authority Over Medical Exclu-
sions, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 331 (1984); Eric W. Sedlak, Nemetz v. INS: The Rights of Gay Aliens
Under the Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity and Mutable Standards of Moral Turpitude, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 881 (1984); Samuel M. Silvers, The Exclusion and Expulsion of Homosexual
Aliens, 15 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 295 (1984); Brian J. Vella, The Immigration and Nationality Act
Excluding Homosexuals from Spouse Status for Purpose of Preferential Admission to the United States
was Upheld as an Exercise of Congress' Plenary Power over Conditions for Immigration, 21 J. FAM. L.
347 (1983); Randy Gerald Vestal, The Exclusion of Homosexual Aliens Without Medical Certification:
In re Longstaff, II N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 413 (1986); Mickey Wheatley, In re Longstaff: Les-
bian and Gay Aliens Denied Naturalization, 8 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 161 (1985); Melissa
Quinn Windham, Immigration and Naturalization Service Policy of Excluding Homosexual Aliens
without a Medical Certificate is Invalid, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1983).
39. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 51.
40. CAIN, supra note 12, at 121 ("In 1981 new regulations were crafted, and they were published
by the DOD as a directive in 1982. The new regulations stated clearly that homosexuality and military
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vicemembers challenged the military's treatment of gay men and lesbians
as unconstitutional, but federal courts upheld the military's exclusionary
policies.41
Despite this, law professors in the era before Bowers did not generally
challenge the legality of antigay regulations, either through scholarship or
collective action at the institutional level. (This stands in stark contrast to
the legal academy's challenge to the military policies in the wake of the
current Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, adopted in 1993.)42 The silence of
law professors was hardly surprising in the 1950s, when even the ACLU
declined to assist gay servicemembers "threatened with dishonorable dis-
charges after World War II... by saying that homosexuality was 'relevant
to an individual's military service.' ' 43 But as the ACLU changed course
and began supporting the constitutional rights of gay Americans in 1960s,
legal academics did not follow.44 Law students, however, did write law
review pieces challenging the military's anti-gay policies as misguided and
unconstitutional. 45
E. Employment Discrimination
Beginning in the 1940s and proceeding through the 1960s, the federal
government systematically began to detect and remove gay Americans
from the State Department and then the government more broadly.46 In the
service were incompatible and that no exceptions would be recognized. Homosexuality was now
grounds for automatic exclusion in all branches of the service."); ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 68 ("A
memorandum of October 11, 1949, codified a sterner policy for excluding sexual deviants from the
armed forces. The new policy made mandatory the prompt separation of all 'known homosexuals."').
41. See, e.g., Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, Belier v. Lehman,
452 U.S. 905 (1981); Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
Hatheway v. Marsh, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
42. See, e.g., FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
43. CAIN, supra note 12, at 67.
44. One exception is Richard B. Saphire, Gay Rights and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitu-
tional Theory, Practice, and Dronenberg v. Zech, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 7673 (1985).
45. See, e.g., Katherine M. Allen, Dronenburg v. Zech: The Wrong Case for Asserting a Right of
Privacy for Homosexuals, 63 N.C. L. REV. 749 (1985); Theresa J. Canepa, Aftermath of Saal v. Mid-
dendorf: Does Homosexuality Preclude Military Fitness?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 491 (1982); Kelly
Carbetta-Scandy, The Armed Services Continued Degradation and Expulsion of Their Homosexual
Members: Dronenburg v. Zech, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055 (1986); Karen A. Corti, Beyond Dronenburg:
Rethinking the Right to Privacy, II VT. L. REV. 299 (1986); Robert A. Dalby, Dronenburg v. Zech:
Fundamental Rights and the Military, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 531 (1986); Harley David Dia-
mond, Homosexuals in the Military: They Would Rather Fight than Switch, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
937 (1985); Patricia D. Duban, Armed Services-Military Military Discharge, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 151
(1979); Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 465 (1969); John Heilman, Constitutional-
ity of Discharging Homosexual Military Personnel, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 191 (1980-1981);
Andrew Berrien Jones, Dronenburg v. Zech: Judicial Restraint or Judicial Prejudice?, 3 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 245 (1984).
46. DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND
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spring of 1950, the Hoey Commission (named after North Carolina Senator
Clyde Hoey) investigated the so-called problem of homosexuals in the
federal government. Although the Commission did not find a single in-
stance of a gay worker divulging state secrets, the Commission issued a
report that "stated emphatically that all of the intelligence agencies of the
government that testified 'are in complete agreement that sex perverts in
Government constitute security risks.' ' 47 Workers were dismissed for
transgressions like being seen in a gay bar.48 During the 1950s and 1960s,
the Department of State dismissed approximately 1,000 persons suspected
of homosexuality. 49
The consequences for gay people caught up in the government's
witchhunts went well beyond the inability to work for the State Depart-
ment. Highly qualified workers were barred from all government work.50
The federal government went to international agencies, including the U.N.,
UNESCO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund and in-
formed them that if they hired homosexuals whom the federal government
had terminated, then those international agencies could lose their financial
support from the American government. 51 Scientists were forced to do
menial work, like digging ditches. 52 Barred from any meaningful employ-
ment, many committed suicide. 53
The government's anti-gay policies were widely known. The State
Department made annual presentations to Congress to announce how many
suspected homosexuals had been fired the previous year.54 As early as
1950, national reporters, such as Eric Sevareid, spoke out against the State
Department's mistreatment of gay employees. 55 Courts upheld government
decisions to fire employees discovered to have ever engaged in any homo-
sexual acts in their past. 56 The government engaged in maneuvers to insu-
late its policies from potentially unfavorable judicial scrutiny. For example,
in the Dew case, "[w]hen the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, the
LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 21 (2004).
47. Id. at 114.
48. CAN, supra note 12, at 105.
49. JOHNSON, supra note 46, at 76.
50. Id. at 157.
51. Id. at 132-33.
52. Id. at 157.
53. Id. at 158.
54. Id. at 76-77.
55. Id. at 107 ("Arguing that a 'frank and open homosexual' was less vulnerable to blackmail than
a philandering heterosexual, Sevareid concluded that homosexuality was 'marginal' to the nation's
security concerns.").
56, Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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government abandoned the charges against Dew and reinstated him. Al-
though this was a fortunate result for Dew, the government's action mooted
the case and prevented further consideration of the government's policy by
the Supreme Court. '57
Law professors remained largely silent. The ACLU, however, issued a
report in 1964, "calling upon the federal government to 'end its policy of
rejection of all homosexuals on that ground alone.' It labeled this policy
'discriminatory' because it was based on attributes that 'bear no necessary
relation to job qualifications.' '' 58 Eventually, courts began protecting gay
civil servants, for example, by finding government violations of the Civil
Service Act.59 Throughout this evolution, legal academics wrote scant lit-
tle.60 Law students, however, advocated legal protection for gay employ-
ees, including through Title VII.61
57. CAIN, supra note 12, at 106-07.
58. JOHNSON, supra note 46, at 190-91.
59. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also Singer v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
60. See J.W. Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Employment
Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1979); Stuart A. Wein, Employment Protection and
Gender Dysphoria: Legal Definitions of Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex and Disability, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1075 (1979); see also Arthur S. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons
with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 681 (1985).
Practitioners also wrote early articles. See, e.g., Penny M. Clark, Homosexual Public Employee:
Utilizing Section 1983 to Remedy Discrimination, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 255 (1981); Andra
Pearldaughter, Employment Discrimination Against Lesbians: Municipal Ordinances and Other Reme-
dies, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 537 (1979); G.R. Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimination in Employ-
ment, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495 (1976).
61. See, e.g., Wayne B. Chew, Title VII Rights of Homosexuals, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 53
(1980); William B. Crumpler, Is Governmental Policy Affecting the Employment of Homosexuals
Rational?, 48 N.C. L. REV. 912 (1970); Patricia H. Cullison, Employment Discrimination Against
Homosexuals by a State Regulated Public Utitlity, a Private Employer, Constitutes State Action and is
Prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution, 2 WHITTIER L. REV. 575
(1980); Dismissal of Homosexuals from Government Employment: The Developing Role of Due Proc-
ess in Administrative Adjudications, 58 GEO. L.J. 632 (1970); Federal Employment of Homosexuals:
Narrowing the Efficiency Standard, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 267 (1969); Government-Created Employment
Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1738 (1969); Government Employment and the
Homosexual, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 303 (1970); Kathleen M. Graham, Security Clearances for Homo-
sexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403 (1973); Stephen C. Hoffman, Analysis of Rationales in Homosexual
Public Employment Cases, 23 S.D. L. REV. 338 (1978); Lee Ann Johnson, Constitutional and Statutory
Restraints on Employment Discrimination against Homosexuals by Public Utilities, 68 CAL. L. REV.
680 (1980); Peggy R. Katzer, Title VII and Section 1985(3): Discrimination Against Homosexuals, 26
WAYNE L. REV. 1611 (1980); Katrina K. Morris, Allegations of Arbitrary Employment Discrimination
Against Homosexuals State a Cause of Action Against Public Utility, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 263
(1980); John E.B. Myers, Singer v. United States Civil Service Commission: Dismissal of a Govern-
ment Employee for Advocacy of Homosexuality, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 172; Betsy Rieke, Title VII and
Private Sector Employment Discrimination Against Homosexuals, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 94 (1980); Donna
L. Wise, Challenging Sexual Preference Discrimination in Private Employment, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 501
(1980).
2009]
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
F. Associational Rights: From Gay Bars to College Campuses
Gay bars became an early focal point of both social networks and the
gay rights movement. Bars were one of the few places-and often the only
place-where gay men and lesbians could meet others like them, reducing
their crippling sense of isolation. In the post-war era, police and liquor
license inspectors targeted bars that served gay customers. Professor Wil-
liam Eskridge has explained how police in Los Angeles and New York
"sometimes employed snap raids: officers would march into a bar, line up
the patrons, taunt them with sexual threats, and arrest or detain people at
random. '' 62 Through a combination of liquor board actions and police har-
assment, in the late 1950s every gay bar in Miami and Miami Beach was
forced out of business.63
Gay bars gave rise to many legal issues. When the owners (and, in
some later cases, patrons) of these establishments began to challenge the
governmental action in courts, most judges to address the issue explicitly
upheld liquor board decisions to shut down gay bars based solely on the so-
called immorality of the customers.64 Success, however, sometimes ensued.
The California Supreme Court notably invalidated anti-gay liquor policies
in 1951 's Stoumen v. Reilly.6 5 Professor Pat Cain has suggested that this "is
probably the first successful gay rights case in America. '66 But the judicial
victory was short-lived when the state legislature responded with explicitly
anti-gay legislation to overturn the decision.67 This statute was, in turn,
struck down by the California Supreme Court in Vallerga v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control.68 Ultimately, gay bars in California suffered a
significant defeat in 1963 when an appellate court "ruled that such conduct
as male patrons kissing and caressing each other was sufficient grounds to
justify revocation of [a bar's] liquor license under the court's dictum in
Vallerga."69 Similar legal battles were fought in the courts of New York,
Florida, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Louisiana, and Illinois, where the
62. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 80.
63. Id. at 78.
64. See, e.g., In re Freedman, 235 A.2d 624 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (suspending liquor license for
bar that served gay customers).
65. 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).
66. CAIN, supra note 12, at 79-80.
67. See CAIN, supra note 12, at 81 ("This statute was enacted by the legislature shortly after the
decision in the Stoumen case, for the explicit purpose of reversing the result in Stoumen. The new
statute declared the illegality of gay bars by authorizing revocation of a liquor license if the premises
were a 'resort for illegal possessors or users of narcotics, prostitutes, pimps, panderers, or sexual per-
verts."); ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 94.
68. 347 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1959).
69. CAIN, supra note 12, at 83.
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owners and customers of gay bars often met defeat. 70
The point here is not to analyze the constitutionality of these old stat-
utes, but to lament the lack of analysis from law professors who worked
during this era. This was an active judicial debate. As noted, most courts of
the 1950s and 1960s ruled against establishments that served gay men and
lesbians. Most infamously, a Florida appellate court upheld an "ordinance
[that] prohibit[ed] liquor licensees from knowingly employing a homosex-
ual person, or knowingly sell[ing] to, serv[ing], or allow[ing] a homosexual
person to consume alcoholic beverages, or [from] knowingly allow[ing]
two or more homosexual persons to congregate or remain in his place of
business."'7 1 Despite the sweeping nature of the ordinance and the opinion
upholding it, apparently no law professors condemned, analyzed, or even
mentioned the opinion for over a decade. Eventually more state courts be-
gan to protect gay bars against state action,72 but still law professors neither
fully analyzed the conflicting opinions nor examined their significance for
gay Americans.
The judicial battle over associational rights of gay people later shifted
from bars to college campuses. When gay student organizations in the
1970s attempted to organize or hold social events, university officials
clamped down. For example, the Dean of Student Affairs at MIT refused a
request to hold a dance because "homosexuality was a disease and. . . stu-
dents should be protected from the unhappiness caused by this disease. '73
In 1972, when the University of Georgia refused to permit a dance by the
student group Committee on Gay Education, the students fought back in
federal court, and the district judge agreed that "the Defendants' denial of
University facilities is an infringement on their first amendment rights of
freedom of speech, assembly and association. ' 74 Professor Cain noted that
the decision "is the first reported case recognizing the First Amendment
associational rights of a gay and lesbian student group. ' 75 Other cases fol-
lowed suit.76
Although the Supreme Court did not issue any opinions discussing the
constitutional rights of gay student organizations, some justices weighed in
70. Id. at 81-88.
71. Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d
895 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
72. See, e.g., One Eleven Wines and Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235
A.2d 12 (N.J. 1967).
73. CAIN, supra note 12, at 93.
74. Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D. Ga. 1972).
75. CAIN, supra note 12, at 94.
76. See Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students Org. of
Univ. of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
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on the issue. When the University of Missouri refused to recognize a gay
and lesbian student organization, Gay Lib, the Eighth Circuit struck down
the university policy as violating the students' First Amendment rights.
When the Supreme Court denied the university's petition for certiorari,
Justice Rehnquist dissented. Focusing on the fact that Missouri had a sod-
omy law and asserting that the existence of a gay student group would
"lead directly to violations of a concededly valid state criminal law," Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued that "the question is more akin to whether those suf-
fering from measles have a constitutional right, in violation of quarantine
regulations, to associate together and with others who do not presently have
measles, in order to urge repeal of a state law providing that measle suffer-
ers be quarantined. ' '77 In Justice Rehnquist's world view, gay men and
lesbians were individual pathogens that needed to be isolated from each
other and from society at large.
The gay student organization cases presented a range of interesting le-
gal issues. They stood in stark contrast to the gay bar cases of the previous
decade. 78 But law professors of the 1970s did not discuss the juxtaposition
of these two lines of authority or its significance for either constitutional
law or the gay rights movement. In particular, law professors did not dis-
cuss or refute Justice Rehnquist's argument that gay people are contagions
or Chief Justice Burger's suggestion in his own dissent from the denial of
certiorari in Gay Lib that lower court decisions finding that gay organiza-
tions have First Amendment rights should be reversed without oral argu-
ment. 79 Except for one practitioner article from the late-1970s, 80 students
wrote the law review scholarship during the 1970s about the legal issues
surrounding university officials' attempted exclusion of gay student or-
ganizations. 81
77. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
78. Professor Cain explained:
The student organization cases provide an interesting contrast to the gay bar cases. In both
sets of cases, the issue was access to public space. In all of the student organization cases,
even when the litigated claim was over space for social purposes, the federal courts readily
recognized the important First Amendment issues at stake. In the gay bar cases, by contrast,
those courts that did recognize the rights of the gay patrons to gather in public never elevated
that right to a First Amendment one.
CAIN, supra note 12, at 98-99
79. Ratchford, 434 U.S. at 1084 (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
80. Lawrence A. Wilson & Raphael Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right of Asso-
ciation, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979).
81. See, e.g., Alisse Camazine, Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 22 ST. LouiS U. L.J. 711
(1979); Chris Elliott, Constitutional Law: Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 46 UMKC L. REV. 489
(1978); Gay Students Organization v. Bonner: Expressive Conduct and First Amendment Protection, 26
ME. L. REv. 397 (1974); Richard E. McLeod, Denial of Recognition to Homosexual Group Abridges
Freedom of Association, 43 Mo. L. REV. 109 (1978). One major professor-authored article came in the
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G. Anti-Discrimination Measures
The university-based gay groups ultimately proved critical to the
growing gay rights movement. In the early to mid-1970s, these groups
successfully lobbied college towns such as East Lansing, Michigan and
Iowa City to adopt anti-discrimination ordinances that banned discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation.82
The early success of the anti-discrimination movement led to a back-
lash as social conservatives sought to repeal nondiscrimination measures
through public referenda, the first being in Boulder, Colorado in May
1974.83 The anti-gay movement received significant national attention
when in 1977 former Miss America Anita Bryant launched her so-called
"Save Our Children" campaign, which sought to repeal nondiscrimination
measures through referenda. "Bryant argued not only that 'homosexuality
is immoral and against God's wishes,' but also charged that the gay rights
law would encourage people to 'cross-dress, molest children, and rape ani-
mals.' 8 4 Most of the anti-gay referenda passed, eliminating protection for
gay people in those jurisdictions. 85
The repeal of individual rights through popular referenda raised seri-
ous constitutional issues, yet law professors were largely silent in response
to the popular backlash against gay rights. It would take over a decade be-
fore law professors authored scholarship questioning the constitutionality
of such anti-gay referenda.
H. Family Law-Custody and Marriage
Anti-gay laws and legal rulings extended beyond the public sphere of
employment to reach into gay households. Few traumas are more devastat-
ing for a parent than to have a child taken away, especially when the parent
has done nothing wrong. Yet judges during the 1970s ripped apart hun-
dreds, and probably thousands, of gay families. While most of the decisions
happened out of the public eye in family courts and unpublished opinions,
many judicial decisions to separate gay parents from their own children
mid-1980s. Linda J. Lacey, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University: Constitutional Values on a
Collision Course, 64 OR. L. REV. 409 (1986).
82. CAIN, supra note 12, at 204.
83. ESKRIDGE, supra note, 4 at 131.
84. Id.
85. ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER 56 (1995) ("From 1974
to 1993, at least 21 referendums were held on the sole question of whether an existing law or executive
order prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination should be repealed or retained. In 15 of these 21
cases, a majority voted to repeal the law or executive order.").
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were published, generally in the form of appellate opinions upholding
lower court decisions to take children away from their gay parents. 86 Dur-
ing this era, courts invoked four rationales for denying custody to gay par-
ents: "that the child might be harassed or stigmatized, that the child's
sexual orientation might be affected, that the child's moral development
might be harmed, and that the state sodomy statute mandates the custody
denial or restriction. '87
Although these rationales were factually incorrect and/or legally sus-
pect, very few legal scholars in the early era of the gay rights movement
examined the growing body of jurisprudence designed to separate gay par-
ents from their own children. Although practitioners-including Nan
Hunter, who would later become a law professor and one of the leading
scholars in the field-published articles on gay custody issues, 88 law pro-
fessors seem to have avoided the topic. Again, law students authored the
bulk of the scholarship. 89
86. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d
691, 694 (Va. 1985); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d. 78 (N.D. 1981); Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
87. Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis,
102 HARV. L. REV. 617, 630 (1989). For custody decisions relying on sodomy laws, see, e.g., L. v. D.,
630 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1,22); In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 97 (1974) (restricting visita-
tion), affd 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
88. See Donna Hitchens & Barbara Price, Trial Strategy in Lesbian Mother Custody Cases: The
Use of Expert Testimony, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 451 (1978-79); Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D.
Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV.
691 (1976); Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal Challenges, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 907 (1986).
89. See, e.g., D.A., Natural Mother's Admitted Lesbian Relationship was Insufficient to Justify
Severance of Her Parental Rights, 20 J. FAM. L. 771 (1982); Robert C. Bagnall et al., Burdens of Gay
Litigants and Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497 (1984); Dolly Wiseman Berry, Avowed Homosexual's Visitation Rights
may be Limited by Court Order Restricting Overnight Visitation and Prohibiting Father from Taking
the Child to Gay Activist Social Gatherings or to Church Which Has a Largely Homosexual Congrega-
tion, 22 J. FAM. L. 185 (1983); Harvey Brownstone, Homosexual Parent in Custody Disputes, 5
QUEEN'S L.J. 199 (1980); Gary L. Cardwell, Doe v. Doe: Destroying the Presumption that Homosexual
Parents are Unfit-the New Burden of Proof 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 851 (1982); Margaret A. Clemens, In
the "Best Interests of the Child" and the Lesbian Mother: A Proposal for Legislative Change in New
York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 1021 (1984); Shaun J. Esposito, Mother's Homosexuality and Accompanying
Embarrassment to Children Held Not Proper Grounds for Removal of Custody, 18 J. FAM. L. 629
(1980); Marie Weston Evans, Parent and Child: An Analysis of the Relevance of Parental Homosexual-
ity in Child Custody Determinations, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 633 (1982); Jane Hagan, Domestic Relations:
the Homosexual Parent in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 509 (1983);
Joseph L. Hardesty, Custodial Mother's Open Homosexual Relationship is Sufficient Change of Condi-
tion to Warrant Modification of Child Custody Order, 21 J. FAM. L. 147 (1982); J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 7 J.
JUV. L. 272 (1983); Philip Kraft, Lesbian Child Custody, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 183 (1983); Judith S.
Landry, Homosexuality and the Custodial Parent in Virginia: The Effects of Roe v. Roe, 8 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 389 (1986); Patricia Leitch, Custody: Lesbian Mothers in the Courts, 16 GONZ. L. REV. 147
(1980); Marilyn Riley, Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional
Challenge that Can No Longer be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 799 (1975); Barbara A. Smart, The
Coming Out Custody Controversy of Lesbian Mothers in Court, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 331 (1981);
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Same-sex marriage represents perhaps the most controversial battle-
ground in the gay civil rights movement today. The legal recognition of
same-sex couples is critical because most rights associated with couples
flow from marriage. Marriage confers many rights and benefits to the indi-
viduals in a marital relationship. 90 Over 1,000 federal statutes and related
regulations reflect the benefits of marriage, including in Social Security,
taxes, and immigration.91 The inability of members of the same gender to
marry each other necessarily imposes significant costs on gay citizens. In
addition to the denial of marriage benefits, the inability of gays to marry is
used to justify discrimination against gay men and lesbians, including de-
nial of custody to gay parents92 and termination from government employ-
ment.93
For most Americans-and probably most legal academics-same-sex
marriage seems like a relatively new issue. But the legal battle over same-
sex marriage began decades ago. Long before Massachusetts became the
first state to recognize same-sex marriages, many couples sought marriage
equality in the courts. In the 1970s, gay couples sued their state and local
governments to obtain marriage licenses. These early efforts failed, but did
produce judicial opinions.94
In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued the first major opinion
on same-sex marriage in Baker v. Nelson.95 Although the court did analyze
the petitioners' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments-mainly by
distinguishing Supreme court precedent that seemed to support marriage
rights for gay couples-the court in a footnote "dismiss[ed] without discus-
sion petitioners' additional contentions that the statute contravenes the First
Amendment and Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. '96
Three years later, a Washington appellate court addressed the issue of
Spouse's Homosexuality Not Grounds for Change of Custody, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 751 (1980);
Steve Susoeff, Assessing Children 's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Ra-
tional Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852 (1985); Lynn Tomo, In re Marriage of Cabalquinto:
Protection of the Visitation Rights of Homosexual Parents, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 598 (1984).
90. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 66-68 (1996).
91. See General Accounting Office Report GAO/OGC-97-16 (Jan. 31, 1997), available at
http://www.access.gop.gov (part of a follow-up report commissioned pursuant to the negotiation sur-
rounding the Defense of Marriage Act).
92. See, e.g., L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing inability of lesbians to marry
as one justification for denying lesbian mother custody of her children following divorce).
93. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1105 n.17 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
94. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. O'Hara, 522 P.2d 1187
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
95. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
96. Id. at 186 n.2.
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same-sex marriage in Singer v. Hara.97 The court struck a respectful tone
and focused primarily on whether the refusal to recognize same-sex mar-
riage violated the state's recently enacted equal rights amendment (ERA).
Because no law professors had addressed the issue in their scholarship, the
only legal literature cited by the court was a student-authored note. 98 The
court also cited another student comment to report "the fact that public
attitude toward homosexuals is undergoing substantial, albeit gradual,
change." 99
Legal academics in the 1970s did not respond to either the Baker or
Singer opinions. They certainly did not attempt to make the case for same-
sex marriage. In 1980, Professor Kenneth Karst boldly advanced arguments
for same-sex marriage in the context of a larger article on associational
rights. 100 Law students wrote and advocated same-sex marriage long before
the topic apparently reached the consciousness of most law faculty., 0 1
In sum, in the decades before the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers,
law was a significant tool for repressing the freedom of gay and lesbian
individuals, as well as for some attempts to resist that repression. While
law review articles in the 1960s through the mid-1980s began to examine
how the law treated gay people and to advocate for legal change, most of
those law review articles were not written by law professors but rather by
practicing lawyers and, especially, by law students.
97. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
98. Id. at 1193 (citing Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973)),
99. Id. at 1196 n.12 (citing Comment, Homosexuality and the Law--A Right to be Different? 38
ALB. L. REV. 84 (1973)).
100. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE. L.J. 624, 682-86 (1980);
see also G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541
(1985).
101. See, e.g., Catherine M. Cullem, Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 15 TULSA L.J. 141 (1979); Peter N. Fowler, Adult Adoption: A New Legal Tool for Lesbians and
Gay Men, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 667 (1984); Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A Constitutional
Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979); William D. Lentz, Marriage Rights-
Homosexuals and Transsexuals, 8 AKRON L. REV. 369 (1975); Arthur J. Silverstein, Constitutional
Aspects of the Homosexual's Right to a Marriage License, 12 J. FAM. L. 607 (1973); Michael D.
Tewksbury, Gaylord and Singer: Washington's Place in the Stream of the Emerging Law Concerning
Homosexuals, 14 GONZAGA L. REV. 167 (1978). See also Sandra Eschenbrenner, The Invalidation of a
Homosexual Marriage for Immigration Purposes, Adams v. Howerton, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 267 (1983).
[Vol 84:2
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
II. How SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW BECAME A FIELD OF
INQUIRY
Part I showed that despite the fact that courts, legislatures, and other
government actors were persecuting gay people in the middle decades of
the 20th century, legal academics were largely absent from the discussion
about those actions. Indeed, they appear to have been unwilling to even
start a debate. This part hypothesizes why law professors were generally
silent while the rights of gay people-including themselves in the case of
law professors who were gay-were being trampled. It then praises those
early law professors who did describe the homophobia within the American
legal system and advocate change. Finally, it examines the role of student
scholarship and argues that the anti-gay Bowers decision had the effect of
helping make pro-gay legal scholarship by legal academics mainstream.
A. Explaining the Early Dearth of Scholarship
The process of legal academics writing scholarship in the hopes of in-
fluencing judges is well-established in American jurisprudence. In common
law development, academic legal discourse often precedes the evolution of
legal doctrine. Law professors espouse a new point of view in such a well-
argued and persuasive manner that common law judges adopt the articu-
lated position as law, or at least allow the academic argument to flavor or
inform their judicial decisions and opinions.
Twentieth-century America witnessed several civil rights revolutions.
Gay Americans, however, lived largely on the periphery of the civil rights
and sexual revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s. Criminal law, family law,
employment law and government policies all discriminated against gay
Americans-and immigration law discriminated against gay immigrants,
labeling all gay men and lesbians as afflicted by psychological disorders.
Yet in the face of this onslaught against millions of innocent people,
the legal academy remained largely silent. Federal, state, and local gov-
ernment officials were persecuting gay Americans. Federal and state courts
were generally neither recognizing nor protecting the rights of gay litigants.
This is precisely the type of scenario where one might expect law profes-
sors to sound the clarion call. But Gay Legal Studies as a field of study did
not exist. Law professors, for the most part, largely did not teach or write
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about such issues. Taking student scholarship out of the count, 102 most of
the articles about gay legal issues published in American law reviews be-
fore 1986 were not authored by law professors. Instead, a significant major-
ity was authored by practitioners and by academics and professionals from
non-legal disciplines, including clergy, 10 3 psychiatrists, 10 4 history profes-
sors, 10 5 business professors, 10 6 and psychology professors, 107 to name but a
few.108
The absence of legal scholarship by law professors may have affected
the analysis, if not the outcomes, of early gay rights cases. When charting a
new path in constitutional law, judges need some authority for staking out
their chosen path. In the absence of relevant precedent, judges often turn to
scholarship. Legal scholarship provides the ammunition-and air cover-
for judges who seek to write opinions that recognize the rights of minori-
ties, whether racial or sexual. But no such body of scholarship existed to
support gay litigants during the 1950s through 1970s. As a result, even
judges inclined to recognize the rights of gay men and lesbians may have
felt constrained by the lack of persuasive authority, such as legal scholar-
ship, upon which to base a pro-gay opinion.
What explains the dearth of early legal scholarship by law faculty ad-
vocating equal treatment for gay Americans? No doubt many different
personal, social, cultural, political, and other factors are relevant to varying
102. This is a large concession because most legal scholarship addressing gay issues was authored
by students. If student scholarship were included in the count, articles by law professors would repre-
sent a minor fraction-around I 0%-of the total scholarship in the area.
103. Ellen M. Barrett, Rev., Legal Homophobia and the Christian Church, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1019
(1979).
104. Karen M. Bowman & Bernice Engle, Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Homosexuality, 29
TEMP. L.Q. 273 (1956); Alex Gigeroff, et al., Sex Offenders on Probation: Homosexuality, 33 FED.
PROBATION 36 (1969); Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., Evaluation of the Homosexual Offender, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 187 (1957) (professor of psychiatry).
105. John D'Emilio, Making & Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Politics and
History, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 915 (1986).
106. Stephen D. Ford, Homosexuals and the Law: Why the Status Quo?, 5 CAL. W. L, REV. 232
(1969).
107. Gregory M. Herek, The Social Psychology of Homophobia: Toward a Practical Theory, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 923 (1986).
108. See also David Adamany, Supreme Court at the Frontier of Politics: The Issue of Gay Rights,
4 HAMLINE L. REV. 185 (1981) (professor of political science); Lawrence R. Deiter, Employment Dis-
crimination in the Armed Services: An Analysis of Recent Decisions Affecting Sexual Preference Dis-
crimination in the Military, 27 VILL. L. REV. 351 (1982) (Air Force captain); Michael W. La Morte,
Legal Rights and Responsibilities of Homosexuals in Public Education, 4 J.L. & EDUC. 449 (1975)
(professor of educational administration); Steven 0. Ludd, The Aftermath of Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney: In Search of the Right to be Let Alone, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 705 (1985) (professor of
political science); J.W. Meeker, et al., State Law and Local Ordinances in California Barring Discrimi-
nation on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745 (1985) (professor of social ecol-
ogy); William Orbach, Homosexuality and Jewish Law, 14 J. FAM. L. 353 (1975) (professor of religion).
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degrees in different cases in explaining why particular legal academics did
not write scholarship about how the law was affecting the lives of gay peo-
ple. A full consideration of those explanations is beyond the scope of this
Introduction. It is important to highlight, though, three reasons why gay
and lesbian law professors in particular might have been understandably
quite reluctant in the decades before Bowers to write legal scholarship
about gay and lesbian issues.
First, it is hardly surprising that legal academics who were gay would
decline to draw attention to their sexual orientation. To publicly acknowl-
edge one's homosexuality was to draw a target on one's back. As noted
above, gay Americans were treated as criminals and psychopaths, who
could be imprisoned or institutionalized. And most law professors are law-
yers as well, and in some states homosexuality was grounds for disbar-
ment. 109 (Here, again, law professors did not write law review articles
about such disbarments, but law students did.)10 The hatred of gay people
was so intense that gay people could not openly oppose the mistreatment
lest the exposure subject them to more mistreatment.
Second, untenured law faculty were particularly vulnerable to reprisals
should they write about gay issues. Gay educators, in general, lived and
taught in fear, as at the time teachers below the university level were termi-
nated for revealing their sexual orientation, yet law professors wrote little
about the issue 1 '1 while law students addressed the problem earlier than
faculty. 112 Even in higher education, outside of law schools, universities
109. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1970); State ex rel. Florida Bar v.
Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825, 825 (Fla. 1957) (disbarring gay attorney based, in part, on existence of state
sodomy law); see ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 73 ("Lawyers, officers of the court, were disbarred for
homosexual activities with consenting adults in Florida, California, and other states.").
110. Barbara Blackford, Good Moral Character and Homosexuality, 5 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 139
(1980); Leslie J. Roberts, Private Homosexual Activity and Fitness to Practice Law: Florida Board of
Bar Examiners, In re N.R.S., 6 NOVA. L. REV. 519 (1982).
111. Joshua Dressier, Survey of School Principals Regarding Alleged Homosexual Teachers in the
Classroom: How Likely (Really) is Discharge?, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 599 (1985); Joshua Dressier,
Gay Teachers: A Disesteemed Minority in an Overly Esteemed Profession, 9 RUTGERS-CAM L.J. 399
(1978); Ronald A. Rubenstein & Patricia B. Fry, Of a Homosexual Teacher: Beneath the Main-Stream
of Constitutional Equalities, 6 TEX. S. U. L. REV. 183 (1981).
112. Kent A. Hansen, Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10: Homosexuality Held Immoral for
Purposes of Teacher Discharge, 14 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101 (1977); Michael Johanns, Maryland
Federal District Court Upholds Transfer and Dismissal of Teacher Because of "Repeated" and "Un-
necessary " Public Appearances Made to Explain his Plight as a Homosexual Teacher, 7 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 92 (1973); Karen S. Lavine, Free Speech Rights of Homosexual Teachers, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1513 (1980); James H. Lowe, Homosexual Teacher Dismissal: A Deviant Decision, 53 WASH. L. REV.
499 (1978); Admission of Status as a Homosexual by Teacher Held Sufficient Cause for Dismissal on
the Basis of Immorality, 16 J. FAM. L. 129 (1977); Remedial Balancing Decisions and the Rights of
Homosexual Teachers: A Pyrrhic Victory, 61 IOWA L. REV. 1080 (1976); Jeanne La Borde Scholz, Out
of the Closet, Out of a Job: Due Process in Teacher Disqualification, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 663
(1979).
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discriminated against untenured gay employees, and federal courts held
that termination was entirely appropriate when a gay employee was so
audacious as to bring a lawsuit arguing that the right to marriage extended
to same-sex couples. Thus, a gay university librarian could be fired for
pursuing such gay rights litigation because, the Eighth Circuit reasoned, the
mere act of seeking rights represented an attempt "to foist tacit approval of
this socially repugnant concept upon his employer, who is, in this instance,
an institution of higher learning." ' 1 3 Other courts were more protective of
gay academics' First Amendment rights, as when the district court in
Delaware awarded damages and ordered reinstatement for a university
lecturer dismissed for discussing his homosexuality in public interviews.] 14
Despite such occasional judicial victories, many untenured professors
would sensibly be too scared to write about gay issues due to a legitimate
fear of the bigot's veto. Tenure votes are generally secret and law profes-
sors who were prejudiced against gay Americans could exercise their big-
otry by secretly voting against granting tenure to assistant professors who
wrote in support of gay rights.
Third, even tenured professors were not safe. Prosecutors and other
government authorities, including university officials, equated homosexual-
ity with criminality. 115 Criminal conduct, in turn, could be sufficient
grounds to terminate a professor, even one afforded the protection of ten-
ure. 116 Laws did not protect gay employees against anti-gay discrimination.
It was perfectly legal then-as it is now in most states-to fire an employee
based solely on her sexual orientation. Indeed, throughout the 1970s, the
ABA declined to advocate an end to discrimination against gay lawyers. 117
In sum, many law professors may have perceived that it was unsafe or
at least not prudent to write any advocacy of gay rights. The gravitational
pull of the closet prevented people from publicly supporting gay rights.
B. The Courage ofAcademic Pioneers in Sexual Orientation and the Law
Given the potential negative consequences, both personally and pro-
fessionally, of advocating basic rights and equal treatment of gay people
perhaps what is surprising is not that most legal academics did not address
gay and lesbian legal issues in their scholarship but rather that a few aca-
113. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971).
114. Aumiller v. Univ. of Delaware, 434 F.Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
115. Leslie, supra note 2.
116. See, e.g., BARRY WERTH, THE SCARLET PROFESSOR (2001).
117. See Scott Slonim, Delegates Call for End to Sex Bias: Gays Lose, 66 A.B.A. J. 1054-55
(1980).
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demics actually did. The first law professors to write about the intersection
of law and sexual orientation all displayed a courage that is hard to appre-
ciate in today's legal climate where the discussion of gay legal issues is
ubiquitous in the legal academy.
In some ways, the modem field of Sexual Orientation and the Law has
its foundations in a law review symposium published in 1979 in the Hast-
ings Law Journal. 118 In the symposium's lead article, Professor Rhonda
Rivera wrote a sweeping and comprehensive overview of the many ways in
which the law-both statutory and common law-unfairly discriminated
against gay men and lesbians.1 19 Despite the fact that this single article
provided a sturdy foundation for a new academic field of law, Professor
Rivera reported two decades later that she "personally received very little
direct comment on it for many, many years" because "most people were
terrified to talk about the issue." 120 Paradoxically, Professor Rivera helped
create a new field of legal scholarship that other law professors-whose
lives were directly affected-were afraid to discuss. That is, with the ex-
ception of a few other legal academics brave enough to write scholarship in
the field that dared not speak its name. 121
Professor Jeff Sherman was a member of this first-mover generation,
118. The proceedings from a smaller conference were published at about the same time in the
N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Social Change. This included a short article by David Richards, see supra
note 16, and two smaller presentations by practitioners. E. Carrington Bogan, Selected Presentations
from the Conference on the Fight for Gay Rights-Securing Gay Rights Through Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 309 (1978-79); Thomas F. Coleman, Selected Presentations
from the Conference on the Fight for Gay Rights: Procedure and Strategy in Gay Rights Litigation, 8
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 317 (1978-79).
119. Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in
the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
120. Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: Twenty Years Later, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 1179
(1999).
121. Professor Rivera updated her initial article twice. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual
Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459 (1985); Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent
Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1981).
Other important scholarship during this era that provided extensive exposition and analysis
included: Richard Delgado, Fact, Norm and the Standard of Review: The Case of Homosexuality, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 575 (1985); Kenneth Lasson, Civil Liberties for Homosexuals: The Law in Limbo, 10
U. DAYTON L. REV. 645 (1985); Kenneth Lasson, Homosexual Rights: The Law in Flux and Conflict, 9
U. BALT. L. REV. 47 (1979); Ralph Slovenko, The Homosexual and Society: A Historical Perspective,
10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445 (1985); see also J.H. Wilkinson & G.E. White, Constitutional Protection for
Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977).
Practitioner articles included: Michael A. Willemsen, Judge Tobriner and the Tolerance of
Evolving Lifestyles: Adapting the Law to Social Change, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 73 (1977).
Some important student scholarship of the era includes: Note, The Constitutional Status of
Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Harris
M. Miller 11, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classi-
fications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984); James N. Benedict, Note, Homo-
sexuality and the Law: A Right to be Different?, 38 ALB. L. REV. 84 (1973); Terry Calvani, Special
Student Contribution, Homosexuality and the Law: An Overview, 17 N.Y.L. F. 273 (1971).
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when against this homophobic backdrop he published his seminal law re-
view article, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator.122 Professor
Sherman's article was a revelation on several levels. Professor Sherman
explained the state of the law objectively, but he then exposed how courts
were more likely to overturn the testamentary plans of gay testators. He
further explained how legal hurdles made estate planning unnecessarily
difficult and complicated for gay people. His scholarship treated gay rela-
tionships as natural, healthy, and deserving of respect.
When Professor Sherman courageously published the article while un-
tenured, 123 he was well aware of the risk he was taking. The article's first
footnote reported the results of a then-recent poll showing that "two-thirds
of the American public considered homosexuality 'obscene and vulgar,'
and that one-half believed that homosexuality would bring about the
'downfall of civilization. '"l 24 Such homophobic views permeated the legal
community: Professor Sherman began his article by noting that "Homo-
sexuality is a subject with which most Americans are still ill at ease, and it
is not surprising that this homophobia is reflected in judicial opinions" and
by quoting a New Jersey judge who had opined that "[f]ew behavioral de-
viations are more offensive to American mores than is homosexuality."' 125
While this common vitriol caused most gay academics to hide their orienta-
tion, Professor Sherman responded with the first law review article to re-
port and document discrimination against gay people in wills and trust law.
Professor Sherman followed up his pre-tenure triumph by writing one
of the first published explanations for why law schools should hire gay
faculty. 126 He argued that gay faculty "(1) provide gay and lesbian students
with needed role models; (2) provide heterosexual students and faculty
members with an image of gay and lesbian competence and value; and (3)
expand the school's intellectual boundaries, as gays and lesbians present
points of view that are both different from those presented by heterosexuals
and necessary to a full understanding of important issues." 127 To support
his third rationale, Professor Sherman discussed how gay academics bring a
unique perspective to the hot-button issues of pornography and abortion.
122. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 225
(1981).
123. Professor Rivera was also untenured when she wrote her field-creating article.
124. Sherman, supra note 122, at 225 n.1 (citiation omitted).
125. Sherman, supra note 122, at 226 (citing H. v. H., 157 A.2d 721, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1959)).
126. Jeffrey G, Sherman, Speaking its Name: Sexual Orientation and the Pursuit of Academic
Diversity, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 121 (1992).
127. Id. at 123-24.
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This essay provided the early basis for what would become Professor
Sherman's most provocative and audacious piece of scholarship, Love
Speech.128 Published by the Stanford Law Review in 1995, Love Speech
presented a moral defense of gay pornography. In marked contrast to ear-
lier literature that argued that pornography is distasteful or repugnant but
must be tolerated in the name of free speech, Professor Sherman argued
that gay pornography was affirmatively valuable, a controversial idea that
other scholars later adopted.
Professor Jeffrey Sherman-along with David Richards, Rhonda
Rivera, and a handful of others (including, as noted below, some of the
authors in this symposium)-were academic trailblazers who risked their
careers so that the upcoming generation of law students, lawyers, and law
professors would have a framework for understanding the legal oppression
of gay men and lesbians and advocating for necessary change. We owe
them a tremendous debt of gratitude. Professor Sherman's pioneering work
in Sexual Orientation and the Law is all the more impressive given his
expertise in the areas of wills, taxation and employee benefits, on which he
has written extensively. 129 His scholarship on these topics has proved in-
fluential in the courts.1 30 And while writing on gay legal issues in the early
1980s may have involved career risks, Professor Sherman has gone on to
be elected an academic fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel and is a member of the American Law Institute. 131
128. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REv. 661
(1995).
129. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamen-
tary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1273 (1999); Jeffrey G.
Sherman, Hairsplitting Under I.R.C. Section 2035(d): The Cause and the Cure, 16 VA. TAX REv. 111
(1996); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 803 (1993);
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Individual Retirement Accounts: Reflections on Some Unanswered Questions, 23
ARIZ. L. REv. 935 (1981); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Prob-
lem of Creditors'Rights, 55 IND. L.J. 247 (1980).
Additionally, as a student at Harvard Law School, Jeff Sherman wrote scholarship about
copyright law. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of Substantial
Similarity, 22 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 81 (1975). The district court for the Southern District of
New York cited Jeff Sherman's Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of Substantial
Similarity for its "extremely useful and practical analysis." Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F.
Supp. 1393, 1403 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
130. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 554 (II1. App. Ct. 2008) (noting Professor
Sherman's "excellent discussion" of the legal issues in Posthumous Meddling, supra note 129); Oregon
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Mercy Killing, supra note 129); Emard v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); N. J. Div. of Youth and Family Serv. v. M.W., 942
A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (same); In re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702 (Alaska 2006)
(same); Plumley v. Bledsoe, 613 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 2005) (same); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d 424
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (same); Brown v. U.S., 329 F.3d 664, (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Hairsplitting, supra
note 129); Mitchell v. Reynolds, 2009 WL 132881 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2009, revised Jan. 7, 2009) (same).
131. He is also the author of JEFFREY G. SHERMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PENSION
PLANNING AND DEFERRED COMPENSATION (1990).
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C. Students of the Revolution
The vast majority of scholarship written on gay legal issues before the
Supreme Court announced the Bowers decision was authored by students.
Many of the student publications are case notes as opposed to longer pieces
that approximate a more traditional professor-authored article. But these
notes are rarely purely descriptive. Most forcefully argue for the recogni-
tion of legal rights for gay Americans. The student authors disagreed with
court decisions that rejected equality and championed judicial opinions that
recognized gay rights.
The early student-authored scholarship ultimately proved persuasive
and useful to courts in upholding the rights of gay litigants. 132 Courts cited
student scholarship in criminal law cases that struck down sodomy laws 133
and invalidated anti-gay solicitation statutes. 134 In family law, courts found
student scholarship helpful in cases allowing gay parents to retain custody
of their children,135 to adopt children 36 (including second-parent adoptions
by same-sex parents) 137 as well as in cases involving adult adoptions. 138
Courts also used student notes to support decisions holding that sexual
orientation should not affect the distribution of assets after dissolution of a
marriage. 139 Courts cited student scholarship in cases rejecting employment
discrimination against gay workers, 140 including cases holding that gay
teachers cannot be terminated solely for their sexual orientation. 141 Also on
132. This section only traces the persuasive effect of pre-Bowers student notes and comments.
Student work after 1986 has no doubt remained influential, but is not the focus of this Introduction.
133. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (citing Constitutionality of Laws
Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974)); People v. Onofre, 415
N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (citing Rizzo, supra note 18); In re P., 400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977)
(citing Rizzo, supra note 18); State v. Trejo, 494 P.2d 173 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972) (citing Jones, supra
note 18; Harris, supra note 18; Johnsen, supra note 18; Couris, supra note 18); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d
638 (AK 1969) (citing Jones, supra note 18; Harris, supra note 18; Johnsen, supra note 18).
134. State v. Faulk, 1978 WL 216536 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (citing Constitutionality of Laws
Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974)).
135. Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d I (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (citing Evans, supra note 89,
Kraft; supra note 89).
136. In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001) (citing Evans, supra note 89).
137. In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(citing Elizabeth Zuckerman, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal Recogni-
tion of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729 (1986)); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315
(Mass. 1993) (same); In Re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (same).
138. In re P.B. for Adoption of L.C., 920 A.2d 155 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2006) (citing Peter N.
Fowler, Adult Adoption: A New Legal Tool for Lesbians and Gay Men, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
667 (1984).
139. M.V.R. v. T.M.R., 454 N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (citing Douglas Warner, Homo-
phobia, "Manifest Homosexuals, " and Political Activity: A New Approach to Gay Rights and the Issue
of Homosexuality, I 1 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 635 (1981).
140. See, e.g., Buttino v. FBI, 801 F.Supp. 298 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citing Miller, supra note 121).
141. Acanfora v. Bd. of Ed. Of Montgomery County, 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973) (citing Note,
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the educational front, courts cited student scholarship in preventing univer-
sities from discriminating against gay student groups. 142 Finally, student
scholarship played a role in immigration cases allowing gay persons to
remain in the country 43 and in one of the few successful challenges to the
military's anti-gay policies.144
This raises the question of why law students were more willing to ad-
vocate gay rights, when law faculty were not. In part, some students proba-
bly had less anti-gay baggage because of their younger age. For example,
most had no memory of gay men being institutionalized as sexual psycho-
paths. In addition, law students may have been better informed about gay
issues. Then, as now, the visibility of gays was greater among younger
Americans. Law students may have had a better appreciation for the legal
lives of gay men and lesbians. In contrast to their professors, the relatively
young law students were more likely to be aware of the goals, tactics, and
motivations of the gay rights movement.
Some student may not have appreciated the professional risks of writ-
ing scholarship supportive of gay rights and how this might alienate poten-
tial employers. But most students, I suspect, were simply brave and
principled. Their sense of justice-and justifiable anger or empathy about
the injustices committed against gay people-may have motivated them to
write about gay rights simply because it was the right thing to do. 145 These
law students were important players in the early movement for gay rights
and, like the few courageous law professors of the 1970s and early 1980s,
are due our gratitude.
D. Bowers as a Turning Point
Law students today may find it difficult to believe that not so long ago
it could be professionally dangerous for law professors to write about gay
Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1738 (1969).
142. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d I (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (citing Miller, supra note 121).
143. In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (citing Note, Government-Created Employ-
ment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1738 (1969); see also Hill v. U.S.l.N.S., 714
F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Bogatin, supra note 38); Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm. v.
U.S.I.N.S., 541 F.Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (same).
144. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Miller, supra note 121); Watkins
v. United States, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Miller, supra note 121).
145. A small number of students may have been liberated by anonymity. During the 1960s and
1970s, some law reviews provided no byline for students. Although notes and comments were each
authored by an individual law student, many law reviews maintained the fiction that this form of schol-
arship was the product of the law review membership as an undifferentiated whole. This allowed stu-
dent authors to remain anonymous, but also to claim credit for the work on their resumes if they chose
to highlight the publication. Either way, this system reduced the danger of unwanted visibility.
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legal issues. How could it be perilous to author scholarship about due proc-
ess, employment discrimination, the constitutionality of certain criminal
laws, wills and estate law, or any of the other areas of law? What changed
between the 1970s and today? A large part of the explanation is that gay
people came out of the closet and put a human face on the clinical and for-
eign label "homosexual." As people interacted with relatives, neighbors,
and co-workers who were openly gay, it became harder for heterosexual
society to view gay people as "sexual psychopaths" worthy of contempt
and legal condemnation. But in addition to more general social changes, the
legal academy had a specific catalyst: Bowers v. Hardwick, the case in
which the Supreme Court held that state sodomy laws were constitutional.
In many ways, Bowers v. Hardwick helped create the field of gay legal
studies. It did so for many reasons. First, once the Supreme Court an-
nounced its first major opinion on the relationship between homosexuality
and substantive due process, constitutional scholars could not ignore the
tenuous relationship between gay Americans and their Constitution. Dis-
cussions on the right to privacy, beginning with Griswold146 and moving
on to Roe v. Wade' 47 would necessarily have to at least touch upon Bowers.
(This in turn meant that gay people stood a better chance of being repre-
sented in the mainstream law school curriculum.) In short, Bowers legiti-
mated the discussion of gay rights in the legal academy.
Second, the Bowers opinion rightly generated a great deal of signifi-
cant scholarship, in large part because the opinion was disingenuous in its
framing of the legal issues, its contortion of relevant legal history, its mis-
application of precedent, and its palpable disdain for millions of gay
Americans. Most respected scholars carefully explained the multitude of
sins wrapped within the Court's holding and reasoning. 148 In addition to
discussions on the nature of constitutional privacy rights and on Bowers'
place in the broader field of substantive due process, the opinion spawned
scholarship focused more specifically on the legal lives of gay men and
146. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
147. 410U.S. 113(1973).
148. Of course, some law professors wrote in defense of sodomy laws. Yet, even these defenses of
anti-gay laws represented a sign of progress, in that prior to Bowers pro-discrimination legal academics
had little need to commit their arguments to paper. Discrimination was the law of the land and few in
the academy had the courage to openly question the then-status quo. Consequently, opponents of gay
rights did not have to defend their positions.
Similarly today, as a minority of legal commentators writes to oppose the recognition of same-
sex marriage, the perceived need to publicly proffer arguments against marriage rights for gay and
lesbian couples shows how far the gay rights movement has come. Even as a handful of same-sex
marriage cases were actually litigated in the 1970s, legal academics generally paid the issue no heed.
Most pro-equality academics essentially censored themselves and anti-gay academics had no need to
defend an essentially unchallenged legal landscape that refused to take same-sex marriage seriously.
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lesbians.
Third, the Bowers decision changed the social and legal landscape in
which legal scholarship occurs. The majority opinion's harsh and disre-
spectful tone-for example, dismissing Hardwick's privacy arguments as
"facetious"I 49-inspired a pro-gay response. Pat Cain explained that the
opinion:
galvanized the lesbian and gay legal community, causing national or-
ganizations to step up their calls for stronger laws to protect gay men and
lesbian, including marriage laws. In October 1986, just months after the
Hardwick decision, the ACLU became the first national civil rights or-
ganization to support the "elimination of legal barriers to homosexual
and lesbian marriages."' 150
This was hardly the reaction that the Bowers majority was hoping to in-
duce. Bill Eskridge has noted that "Hardwick angered gay people with its
disrespect and with its unembarrassed ignorance about homosexuals and
their history. In defiance of what was considered open bigotry, many gay
lawyers came out of the closet, and gay legal activism was reenergized
overnight."15 ' As lawyers and regular folk reacted to the Bowers opinion by
increasing their support for gay rights, 152 it became easier for law profes-
sors-gay, straight, or bisexual-to expose the various ways in which lo-
cal, state, and federal law unfairly discriminated against gay people and to
make the case for equal rights.
Ultimately, the Bowers opinion changed the landscape of legal schol-
arship, as it became both safer and more acceptable for all academics to
weigh in on the law's treatment of gay men and lesbians. Ironically, while
making life more dangerous for many gay men and lesbians, the Bowers
decision made life less dangerous for academics writing about gay legal
issues.
III. THE NEXT STEPS IN THE EVOLUTION OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW
The contributions to this symposium demonstrate how Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Law has evolved as a field of academic inquiry. The first four
contributions address various aspects of the legal battle for same-sex mar-
149. 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("to claim that a right to engage in such conduct [sodomy] is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is, at
best, facetious.").
150. CAIN, supra note 12, at 257.
151. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 167.
152. See CAIN, supra note 12, at 181 ("The movement got an amazing dose of positive, supportive
publicity after the loss in Hardwick.").
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riage. This is an appropriate way to begin this symposium for several rea-
sons. First, Professor Sherman's seminal article, Undue Influence and the
Homosexual Testator, foreshadows the current debate by noting the legal
asymmetry in estate law between married opposite-sex couples and same-
sex couples who could not marry. 153 Second, in addition to same-sex mar-
riage being the current ground zero in the battle over gay rights, each of the
four articles shows the growing sophistication of scholarship in Sexual
Orientation and the Law.
The articles examine the history, legal arguments, and consequences
of the current legal battle over same-sex marriage. Nothing like this existed
when courts heard the first constitutional challenges to same-sex marriage
bans in the 1970s. The ongoing debate-and win-loss record in judicial
challenges-will look much different and brighter because of the full par-
ticipation by legal academics, including our contributors here.
Professor Jane Schacter-one of the first law professors to teach Sex-
ual Orientation and the Law as a course and a co-author of a widely re-
spected casebook on the topic-begins the symposium by revisiting an
often overlooked fact from the history of same-sex marriage in America.
Professor Schacter surveys the internal debate within the gay community
that took place between those who favored same-sex marriage and those
who feared the perceived assimilation into an institution created by a domi-
nant culture that had been hostile to both gay people and the equal treat-
ment of women. Professor Schacter shows how the backlash against the
Hawaii Supreme Court's Baehr decision in 1993154 effectively unified the
gay community in support of same-sex marriage, in part, because the oppo-
nents of equal rights for gay Americans made same-sex marriage the pri-
mary battleground over gay rights more broadly. After presenting the legal
history of the battle over same-sex marriage, Professor Schacter considers a
series of counterfactuals in order to explore other paths that gay rights ad-
vocates could have pursued, including domestic partnerships and civil un-
ion. The article demonstrates that there is more than one path to gay rights
and suggests avenues for future empirical research on same-sex marriage
and its effects on the gay community.
Professor Ed Stein's contribution shows how the arguments against
same-sex marriage have changed over time. In the earlier 1970s cases,
courts engaged in almost no actual constitutional analysis. 155 In rejecting
153. Sherman, supra note 122, at 230-31.
154. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
155. For example, in Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973), the court
simply asserted "no constitutional issue is involved. We find no constitutional sanction or protection of
the right of marriage between persons of the same sex."
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the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, the courts didn't bother to explain why
marriage rights were unavailable to same-sex couples. 156 Some courts,
however, asserted that marriage could be limited to opposite-sex couples
because marriage was a vehicle for raising children. Professor Stein re-
views this procreation argument and its demise in the face of evidence and
logic. He then explains how the traditional procreation argument has
morphed into the accidental procreation justification for same-sex marriage
bans, namely that marriage can constitutionally be limited to opposite sex
couples because only they can accidentally procreate. In his article, Profes-
sor Stein methodically dismantles the so-called accidental procreation ar-
gument against same-sex marriage. By calmly and persuasively dissecting
and disproving the latest argument against giving equal rights to same-sex
couples, Professor Stein's article helps establish that bans on same-sex
marriage are without a rational basis.
Professor John Culhane explores the relationship between same-sex
marriage, tort law, and private ordering, examining important intersections
of three disparate fields of law. In his article, Professor Culhane scrutinizes
the arguments against same-sex marriage in general, as well as the congres-
sional debate over the Federal Marriage Amendment, which would amend
the U.S. Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage. But beyond this, he
explores the unappreciated effects that such legal moves have on the day-
to-day existence of gay couples. In particular, he explains how the differ-
ences between tort and contract can have important implications for same-
sex couples denied the ability to legally wed. Finally, he puts these legal
issues in context and provides both suggestions and hope for gay rights
advocates.
Professor Patricia Cain supplies the final contribution that touches on
the legal issues surrounding same-sex marriage. Before discussing her arti-
cle, it bears noting that, like Jeffrey Sherman, Professor Cain is one of the
academic pioneers in the field of Sexual Orientation and the Law. In addi-
tion to her impressive body of scholarship, Pat Cain made history by being
half of the first open same-sex couple in the legal academy, along with her
partner (and now wife) Jean Love. Each prolific and respected in her own
156. Judges largely asserted that marriage meant opposite-sex marriage and then quoted dictionary
definitions of marriage as meaning only between a man and a woman. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). This tactic will no longer work in the future as standard dictionaries
have updated their definitions to include same-sex marriage. Now, courts have to actually advance
legitimate reasons why same-sex couples are denied the marriage rights that heterosexual couples take
for granted. This requirement of evidence to support the status quo definition of marriage will ulti-
mately lead to an expansion of marriage rights-much as once defenders of anti-miscegenation laws
had to support their opposition to interracial marriage with evidence, the definition of marriage ex-
panded.
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right, as a couple Professors Cain and Love definitely fulfilled Professor
Sherman's prediction that openly gay faculty can serve as role models for
other gay lawyers and academics, as well as demonstrate the competence,
skill, and intellect of gay lawyers to the broader society. In her contribution
to this symposium, Professor Cain analyzes one of the worst consequences
of the federal Defense of Marriage Act-DOMA as tax policy. In particu-
lar, Professor Cain focuses on Section 3 of DOMA, which has the effect of
forcing disparate tax treatment for same-sex couples that are legally mar-
ried in their home state. Professor Cain cogently explains why DOMA
creates bad tax policy, how the policy is irrational in a manner that under-
mines the constitutionality of this provision of DOMA, and how Congress
should remedy the problem.
Professor Arthur Leonard is another of the true pioneers in the field of
Sexual Orientation and the Law. His encyclopedia on Sexual Orientation
and the Law helped establish the field. He is also one of the first law pro-
fessors to write about the legal implications of AIDS. In his contribution to
this symposium, Professor Leonard analyzes the lingering effects of Bow-
ers v. Hardwick. Because the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas1 57 re-
versed Bowers, one would expect that it has no continuing legal
significance. Professor Leonard explains how before Lawrence, a large
body of federal cases relied on Bowers to deny the legal claims of gay men
and lesbians, especially those based on equal protection arguments-
despite the fact that Bowers was not an equal protection case. Professor
Leonard argues that Bowers continues to infect judicial thinking, leading to
adverse results in employment and military cases. The article is important
because once courts recognize that decisions based on the repudiated Bow-
ers opinion are themselves suspect-if not invalid-the import of the Law-
rence opinion can be realized.
M.V. Lee Badgett, Brad Sears, Holning Lau, and Deborah Ho present
their research on employment discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender people. The authors are affiliated with the Williams Insti-
tute at UCLA School of Law, a think tank that focuses on the legal issues
confronting the LGBT community. In their contribution to this symposium,
Bias in the Workplace, the authors show that employment discrimination
against LGBT employees remains significant. The Williams Institute's
presence at one of America's most respected law schools shows how the
study of gay legal issues has evolved and demonstrates the progress that the
gay rights movement has made. This type of research was not possible in
157. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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the forty years following World War II because gay employees in so many
professions would be terminated should their sexual orientation be discov-
ered. Studies such as this lay the groundwork for protective legislation,
including state anti-discrimination laws and the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act158 at the federal level.
Finally, Professor Andrew Koppelman concludes the symposium by
placing Professor Sherman's article, Love Speech, within the larger debate
about free speech and pornography. Professor Koppelman develops James
Madison's argument for protecting speech and shows how it is critical but
incomplete. He rebuts those who would narrowly construe Madison's posi-
tion. Professor Koppelman then extends Professor Sherman's thesis-that
gay pornography is valuable and life-affirming for gay men who lead iso-
lated existences-and explains that gay pornography has a political com-
ponent and hence is worthy of First Amendment protection.
CONCLUSION
We owe an enormous debt of gratitude to those legal scholars who
wrote in the pre-Bowers era and explained why the law should be more
inclusive and protect the rights of gay men and lesbians. In large part be-
cause of their efforts, the academic environment is much different-and
better-today than in the pre-Bowers era. The ABA's anti-discrimination
policy includes sexual orientation. The AALS includes sexual orientation
in its anti-discrimination policy. 159 Over a hundred openly gay faculty
members are listed in the AALS Directory. Most law schools have a course
on Sexual Orientation and the Law. Several casebooks on Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Law exist, all by highly respected legal academics.
Hundreds of law review articles lay out cogent legal arguments for
recognizing constitutional rights and creating statutory rights for gay
Americans. I am proud that this symposium presents seven more excellent
articles by some of the best scholars in the field. And I am extremely
pleased to dedicate this symposium to my friend and colleague Jeff
Sherman.
158. H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007).
159. Indeed, Justice Scalia mocked the AALS policy in his Romer dissent. Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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